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Abstract 
Online bidding strategy is one of the most 
discussed topics in online auction research. This 
research aims to empirically confirm online 
bidding strategies in single-unit auctions and 
evaluate these strategies in the context of auction 
winning outcome, final price evaluation, and 
perceived enjoyment. Both objective and subjective 
data of online single-unit auctions were collected to 
validate our postulated hypotheses. Our findings 
suggest that there are three basic bidding strategies 
in single-unit auctions and they indeed have 
different impacts on auction biddings. 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, online auctions have received wide 
acceptance in electronic commerce. This new form 
of electronic shopping channel offers advantages of 
flexible pricing, convenient access, time saving, 
and diversified product offerings [36] that 
traditional sales channels could not offer. The 
success and popularity of online auctions have 
drawn many researchers’ interest in this research 
domain. Many researchers have devoted much to 
the investigations of such topics as Internet 
auctions development [11] [46], auction site 
technology and service [24] [40], bidding 
behaviour [8] [9] [12] [19] [31], reputation or trust 
[4] [22] [27] [40] [41], winner’s curse [6] [33], 
mechanisms [16] [23] [25] [28] [39]. Recently, 
some researchers performed a meta-analysis of 
eighty-three articles on online auctions and 
concluded that research on this topic can be 
categorised into three major areas – facilitating 
factors, consumer behaviour and auction outcomes 
[17].  
Although much research has been carried 
out in an attempt to understand online auctions, not 
much effort has been devoted to investigate 
bidders’ bidding strategies. Of these limited 
investigations, some researchers [10] have 
thoroughly studied online bidders using objective 
bidding data extracted from Yankee auction 
websites. Through the analysis of these objective 
data, they found that bidders in Yankee auctions 
are not homogeneous in terms of their bidding 
behaviors. They also found that different bidding 
strategies will generate different auction outcomes, 
including winning likelihood and consumer surplus 
extraction. 
Undeniably, the findings of Bapna et al. 
[10] contribute significantly to our understanding 
of bidding behavior and bidding strategy in online 
auctions. However, the Yankee auction they 
studied is one kind of multi-unit auction and 
another popular auction type in e-commerce is 
single-unit auction. There are some differences 
between these two kinds of auctions. For example, 
in Yankee auctions, bidders do not only bid on 
prices but also on units (can be more than one, but 
less than the quantity on auctioned). Bidding takes 
place progressively on a predetermined starting 
price and bid increment. Bidders with the highest 
bids won the auction. If there was a tie on winning 
bids and there were not sufficient units for all 
winners, the tie would be broken first by price, 
second by quantity, and third by time. Single-unit 
auction, on the other hand, follows English 
auction’s mechanism, which begins with the lowest 
acceptable price until no bidder will further 
increase the bid. With this auction mechanism, 
there is always one unit auctioned at a time and the 
winning bidder is always the one with the highest 
bid. Hence, time priority is not a concern in single-
unit auctions.  
With the difference between single- and multi-
unit auctions, it is thus critical to investigate the 
applicability of bidding strategies identified in 
multi-unit auctions to single-unit auctions. In 
addition, findings based on objective data is limited 
in shedding light on the application rationale of 
these bidding strategies, their impacts on bidding 
outcomes, and their applications in fulfilling 
bidding motivations. An empirical survey of 
bidders in their adoptions of bidding strategies, 
thus, may complement and supplement the 
observations derived from objective data. In this 
regard, we proposed three research questions to 
investigate the bidding strategies in single-unit 
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auctions and their impacts on biddings. These 
questions are:  
1. In single-unit auctions, when bidders bid, do 
they really follow different bidding strategies?  
2. What are the bidding strategies these bidders 
adopt? 
3. How do these bidding strategies impact 
auction winning outcome, final price 
evaluation, and bidding enjoyment?  
 
Research Background 
A bidding strategy represents a series of 
interrelated types of bidding behaviour that a 
bidder adopts with a certain purpose or tactic in 
mind across different phases of an online auction 
[1]. Bapna et al. [8] [9] [10] have studied bidding 
strategies using bid time (including the entry and 
the exit time) and the number of bids as proxies, 
together with the observation of the bidding price. 
Based on these criteria, they clustered online 
bidders into five categories -- evaluators (early or 
middle), participators, agent bidders, opportunists, 
and sip-and-dippers. Evaluators refer to bidders 
who place just one bid at an early stage (or 
sometimes in middle stages) of an auction; 
participators are bidders who bid throughout the 
auction, thus increasing the price by the minimal 
bid increment; agent bidders use online bidding 
agents to bid at the minimal level required to outbid 
the current highest bidder until the bid exceeds the 
reserve price they set earlier; opportunists are late 
bidders who act only towards the end of an auction; 
and sip-and-dippers bid both in the early stage and 
near the end. 
The classification shows that different 
bidders adopt different bidding strategies. 
Evaluators “evaluate” the auction through their sole 
bid that is usually increased by a “jump”, bigger 
than the minimal bid increment. This bidding 
strategy is called “jump bidding” [12] [19]. 
Participators follow other bidders and increase their 
prices by the minimal bid increment. This common 
strategy is called ratchet bidding (or nibbling) [15] 
[21]. Agent bidders employ online bidding agents 
in submitting their bids, which is called agent 
bidding [19]. Opportunists only bid near the end of 
auctions. The strategy taken by them is believed to 
be snipe bidding (or late bidding) [12] [31] [37]. 
Sip-and-dippers are also believed to adopt snipe 
bidding except that they have one bid in the early 
stage that is only for getting the time priority in 
some multi-unit auctions. 
The research of Bapna et al. [10] does not 
only identify and describe heterogeneous bidder 
types in Yankee auctions, but also examines the 
auction outcomes of these bidders. In their study, 
winning likelihood and consumer surplus 
extraction are the two auction outcome variables 
they investigated. First, they found that the 
probability of winning amongst different bidder 
types is unequal. Their findings show that 
opportunists and sip-and-dippers have the highest 
winning likelihood, followed by participators, 
evaluators, and agent bidders. They also found that 
bidders have different ability of extracting 
consumer surplus, led by agent bidders, and trailed 




This study aims to identify the bidding strategies 
and their auction outcomes in the context of single-
unit auctions. Based on literature review, bidders 
bid differently in Yankee auctions using different 
strategies. These identified strategies will be re-
examined in single-unit auctions and extended to 
test their impacts on winning outcome, final price 
evaluation, and perceived enjoyment. Auction 
winning outcome investigates whether a bidder 
wins an auction. Final price evaluation is a 
winners’ subjective evaluation of her/his final 
auction price. Perceived enjoyment assesses the 




Bapna et al. [10] have found the heterogeneity of 
bidders in their investigation of Yankee auctions. 
These bidders actually take four basic types of 
bidding strategies, including jump bidding, agent 
bidding, ratchet bidding and snipe bidding. 
Although Yankee auction supports multi-unit 
auction and its rules are different from those of 
single-unit auctions, we believe that the bidding 
strategies identified in Yankee auctions could be 
extended to single-unit auctions as well. Hence, we 
hypothesize that: 
H1a:  Online bidders in single-unit auctions, as in 
multi-unit auctions, are heterogeneous in 
their bidding strategies. 
H1b:  Single-unit auction bidders, like their multi-
unit auction counterparts, also adopt similar 
strategies in their biddings. 
 
Winning Outcome 
Bapna et al. [10] found that bidders with different 
bidding strategies have different winning likelihood 
in Yankee auctions. Opportunists and sip-and-
dippers were found to have the highest percentage 
of winning their auctions, followed by evaluators, 
participators, and agent bidders. Presumably, it is 
the bidding strategies that caused a difference in 
winning likelihood. Opportunists and sip-and-
dippers, for example, are more eager to win, thus 
motivating them to adopt snipe bidding strategy. 
With this bidding strategy, bidders snipe just before 
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the end of auctions, leaving other bidders little time 
to response, which highly increases their chance of 
winning.  
Bidders with jump bidding strategy submit bids 
that are much higher than required, thus 
intimidating their competitors and creating a better 
chance for their winning. This strategy has been 
found to be preferred by experienced bidders [12] 
and effective in auctions with fewer overall bids [3] 
[10] [19]. Ratchet bidding, on the other hand, 
requires bidders to observe and act continuously 
during auctions, thus increasing their commitment 
and consequential winning likelihood. Of the four 
bidding strategies, agent bidding is the most 
mechanical and the least flexible. This strategy also 
involves the least commitment, time, and resources 
from the bidders, which probably could have a 
reverse effect on winning likelihood. Based on the 
above findings and discussions, we propose that: 
H2:  Different bidding strategies have different 
auction winning outcomes in single-unit 
auctions.  
 
Final Price Evaluation 
Bapna et al. [10] validated that bidding strategies 
have differential effects on the extraction of 
consumer surplus. In multi-unit Yankee auctions, 
the winning bidders pay their own winning prices, 
which may be higher than the lowest winning price, 
called marginal price. The loss of consumer surplus 
is thus the difference of the actual price paid and 
the marginal price. In single-unit auctions, the 
winning bidders pay the actual winning prices that 
may be different from the maximum prices they are 
willing to pay for the auctions. Therefore, the logic 
of consumer surplus still exists in single-unit 
auctions, but is conceptualized and calculated in a 
different way. If a winning price is lower than what 
a bidder is willing to pay, this bidder has a positive 
consumer surplus. Given the findings that bidding 
strategies have differential effects on the extraction 
of consumer surplus, it is believed that bidding 
strategies could also have differential effects on the 
evaluation of final prices in winning auctions. 
Hence, we propose that: 
H3: Different bidding strategies result in different 




Different bidding strategies could have different 
effects on bidding process and consequence, which 
may affect the bidders’ perceived enjoyment during 
an auction. For example, sniping other bidders near 
the end of auctions could be exciting by offering 
just one bid, which could possibly bring success. 
Ratchet bidding could also be enjoyable by 
following the bids of others continuously and 
closely, which could turn an auction into a game. 
Jump and agent bidding strategies may also have 
different intensity of ‘fun’. Hence, we propose:  
H4: Different bidding strategies result in different 




Instrument Development and Pre-test 
This study adopted an online survey approach in 
data collection. A three-stage validation process 
was performed to ensure the validity and reliability 
of our questionnaire. First, whenever possible, 
previously validated questions and generally 
accepted instrument construction guidelines [14] 
[20] [45] were followed. Second, the survey was 
pre-tested by four business professors with 
expertise in survey research, IS, and auction; and 
by six graduate students. The feedback from this 
phase resulted in some restructuring and refinement 
of the survey to improve its quality and content 
validity. Third, a pilot study of the questionnaire 
was administered to 25 online bidders randomly 
chosen from Taobao.com – a major online auction 
website in China. The Cronbach’s alphas for all 
question items in this pilot test were above or near 
0.80, suggesting adequate reliability of the 
questionnaire [32]. The pilot test also resulted in a 
few changes in wording and sentence structure, 
which improved the survey’s content validity. 
 
Data Collection 
Both objective and subjective data in our research 
were collected from online bidders randomly 
chosen from the completed single-unit auctions in 
Taobao.com following a three-stage process. First, 
auctions completed recently in Taobao.com were 
randomly selected for our survey.  Second, six 
hundred bidders were randomly chosen from the 
bidding lists of these auctions. Only validated 
bidders, whose identities have been validated by 
Taobao.com, were selected. Third, the chosen 
participants were contacted through an online 
instant messenger – WangWang, an online tool 
provided by Taobao.com to facilitate 
communications among users. The chosen bidders 
were sent a brief introduction, including the 
research objective and requirements, and an 
invitation to participate in our study. They were 
also informed of a RMB¥10 reward if they 
successfully complete an online survey.  
A total of 186 bidders responded positively to our 
invitation. They were asked to complete an online 
questionnaire hosted in the website of a 
professional online survey company. The use of 
this service allowed us to deal with the problems of 
access control, authentication and multiple 
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responses associated with web-based data 
collection [44].  
At the end of two months, after two rounds of 
reminding messages, 179 bidders completed the 
questionnaire. These respondents’ user IDs were 
then used to match the IDs of their auction 
information recorded in Taobao.com. Both 
subjective survey data and objective bidding data 
were used to evaluate the research hypotheses 
proposed in our study. 
 
Variable Operationalization 
The measure of winning outcome was based on 
Bapna et al.’s [10] winning likelihood. The only 
difference is that winning outcome measures 
whether a bidder has won the auction as an 
outcome; while winning likelihood measures the 
percentage of winning auctions in one group. Final 
price evaluation was adapted from Padula and 
Busacca’s study [34], which evaluated price from 
the dimensions of cheapness, fairness and variety. 
However, their study evaluates products that may 
have a variety of prices, which differs from our 
study that each auction has only one final price 
without any variety. Therefore, price variety 
dimension was dropped while the other two were 
kept. The measures of perceived enjoyment were 
adapted from research on hedonic shopping, 
including adventure perception [2] and joy 
perception [5]. 
 
Data Analysis and Results 
Respondent Profile 
Among the 179 valid respondents, 77.1% of them 
are female and 22.9% male. Ninety-five percent of 
them are in the age range of between 19 and 38. 
They are mostly college/university educated (81%) 
and with a monthly income of less than 3000RMB 
(71.5%). Their occupations are also widely 
distributed, with government employees, free 
workers, students, and academics topping the list. 
 
Reliability and Validity Analysis 
This study has taken a number of measures to 
ensure the validity and reliability of the instrument. 
As far as the instrument’s construct reliability is 
concerned, a reliability test calculating Cronbach’s 
alpha values was performed. The alpha values of 
final price evaluation and perceived enjoyment 
were 0.909 and 0.865 respectively, which are 
significantly above the 0.7 threshold level.  
The instrument was further assessed for its 
construct reliability using exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA). The initial factoring step involved 
the application of principal-component analysis to 
determine the adequate number of factors to 
explain the observed correlations.  Kaiser's rule 
was then applied to remove the principal 
components whose eigenvalues were less than one; 
this resulted in a two-factor solution loaded in 
accordance with the a priori theoretical expectation.  
Next, a two-factor solution was forced by utilizing 
orthogonal (Varimax) rotation.  Only those items 
with factor loadings larger than 0.5 were then used 
in further analyses. The results of this two-step 






PE1 .688 -.177 
PE2 .711 -.139 
PE3 .796 .168 
PE4 .801 .173 
PE5 .738 .320 
PE6 .789 .264 
FPE1 .079 .790 
FPE2 .204 .821 
FPE3 .123 .811 
FPE4 .130 .892 
Cronbach’s alpha .865 .909 
Table 1. The exploratory factor analysis results 
The convergent validity of our constructs was also 
evaluated through its average variance extracted 
(AVE).  The AVE values of these two factors are 
0.54 and 0.70, all above 0.5, which surpassed the 
minimal recommended value. Furthermore, they 
are also higher than their shared variance, 0.11. In 
conclusion, the tests for both factor loading and 
AVE do not show any significant violations, 
thereby demonstrating adequate convergent and 
discriminant validity of our constructs. 
 
Hypothesis Testing and Discussions 
Five hypotheses were postulated in this study. The 
first two hypotheses on bidding strategies were 
validated with cluster analysis. The remaining three 
hypotheses that investigate the effect of bidding 
strategies on winning outcome, final price 
evaluation, and perceived enjoyment, were tested 
with ANOVA. 
 
Cluster Analysis of Bidding Strategies 
This study adopted a two-step cluster analysis 
method to identify the bidding strategies adopted in 
single-unit auctions. In Bapna et al.’s [10] 
investigation of bidder types, they selected time of 
entry, time of exit, and number of bids (NOB) as 
proxies in their cluster analysis. We adapted their 
approach and replaced the entry time and exit time 
with the sequence number of entry (SNOE) and the 
sequence number of exit (SNOX). The rationale for 
such changes was due to a large influx of bidders 
close to the end of auctions, resulting in many 
bidders having close entry time. The use of entry 
and exit sequence numbers could eliminate this 
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problem, but still preserved the logic of entry and 
exit time. In our cluster analysis, we also added a 
new proxy – number of agent bids (NOAB) – to 
help identify the frequency of agent use as a 
strategy. Because our sample auctions have 
different number of bids from each other, all 
selected proxies (SNOE, SNOX, NOB, and NOAB) 
were standardized (divided by the total number of 
bids in each auction) to eliminate any adverse 
effect on clustering.  
In the first step of deriving bidders’ 
clusters, hierarchical cluster analysis was 
performed to generate a hierarchical dendogram 
and an agglomeration schedule table. The results 
suggest that the percentage of the change of 
agglomeration coefficients (the value started to 
decrease instead of increase) from 3 cluster to 2 
cluster is the biggest and that of from 4 to 3 is the 
least, indicating 3 is the most appropriate number 
of the clustering. This three-cluster solution of 
bidding strategies confirmed our proposal (H1a) 
that different bidders use different strategies in 
single-unit auctions. 
Once the optimal cluster number was 
determined, our next step was to conduct a K-mean 
cluster analysis to generate this 3-cluster solution. 
The results, as shown in Table 2, suggest that 
Cluster 1 has the highest number of agent bids and 
could be interpreted as agent bidding. Cluster 2 has 
high SNOE and SNOX and low NOB and NOAB. 
It seems that bidders in this cluster bid late and 
infrequently, which are the major characteristics of 
snipe bidding. Cluster 3 suggests that bidders in 
this category are using ratchet bidding strategy due 
to earlier SNOE and more NOB than Cluster 2 but 
less NOAB than Cluster 1. 





SNOE 0.314 0.799 0.242 173.79**
SNOX 0.932 0.964 0.450 36.47**
NOB 0.405 0.176 0.197 50.77**
NOAB 0.143 0.014 0.058 241.36**
*    Significant at p<=0.1 level 
** Significant at p<=0.05 level 
Table 2. The Results of the Cluster Analysis 
Our cluster analysis suggest that the 
strategies identified in the three-cluster solution 
shared similar characteristics with those strategies 
identified in previous studies [10] [12] [15] [19] 
[21] [37], thus supporting our hypothesis (H1b) 
that bidders in single-unit auctions also adopt 
similar bidding strategies, such as snipe bidding, 
agent bidding, and ratchet bidding. 
 
Characteristics of Bidding Strategies 
ANOVA analysis was then performed to compare 
the means of winning outcome, final price 
evaluation, and perceived enjoyment across the 
bidding strategies. The results suggested that the 
differences in the means of winning outcome and 
perceived enjoyment of the three bidding strategies 
were significant, thus supporting hypothesis (H2) 
that bidding strategies have differential impacts on 
auction winning outcome and hypothesis (H4) that 
bidding strategies have differential impacts on 
perceived enjoyment. We, however, did not find 
bidding strategies to have significantly different 
effect on final price evaluation (H3). Therefore, 
this hypothesis was not supported in our study. 
 
Conclusions and limitations 
This study aims to confirm the research findings of 
Bapna et al.’s [10] study on bidding strategies in a 
single-unit auction context and explore the impacts 
of these strategies on auction outcomes. Our 
research findings confirm most of our postulated 
hypotheses, which could shed some light on 
suggesting avenues for future e-auction 
explorations. In addition, we improved the cluster 
analysis by modifying and adding proxies to 
identify bidder clusters more objectively.  
However, this research has its own limitations. 
First, the data were collected from one online 
auction website, which may cause a bias in 
sampling. In future research, data from multiple 
auction websites have to be collected for theoretical 
validation and confirmation. Second, our sample 
size was not large enough for theoretical validation 
and development. Future studies should generate a 
larger sample size to validate and extend our 
research findings.  
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